It seems the nation is descending into chaos, or worse, like watching an alcoholic spouse or child spiraling toward rock bottom. We are not there yet, but reading the news, it seems imminent, and really all I can do is watch it happen with a growing sense of despair. Thomas B. Edsall has published an editorial piece in the NY Times, "The Peculiar Populism of Donald Trump." It's one of those pieces that summarizes more academic writing, and for me, such pieces are comforting. I can play Dr. Picard, diagnosing the disease, without necessarily attending to the fact that the disease is destroying a loved one. He begins his piece, with the simple assertion that "All wars have unintended consequences, including culture wars." His basic tenant is that
liberal victory in the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 70s, with its emphasis on so-called postmaterialist values — personal fulfillment, openness to new ideas, and support for previously marginalized populations — had its costs, which political analysts have been reckoning. Those costs have become particularly evident in the eruption over the past year of the Brexit vote in Britain, the increasing power of anti-immigrant parties across Europe and the ascendance of right-wing populism in America.
I and others have argued similar points in the past. During my graduate student days, I garnered a very minor reputation among my peers at Brown for calling out the bullshit and self-defeating nihilism of post-structuralist and post-modernist thought. Although it didn't pop up much then, I would have to include the notions of post-racial and post materialism. It doesn't take a Spiro Agnew to point out that there's something a bit effete about most liberal takes on post-racialism, keeping race as a marker of identity solely to upend "traditional" hierarchical structures predicated on race -- likewise, keeping economic social class as a marker of identity solely to critique the values and behavior of the ruling economic social classes. In either case, it's altogether too much like a privileged adolescent keeping the trust fund while bemoaning his parents' racial and economic values.
I say this with a sense of foreboding. Let me just suggest that, to actually achieve post-materialist values, one would need to transcend materialist concerns. Maslow and his hierarchy of needs quickly comes to mind. At the base of his pyramid, there are physiological and safety needs, and although one is indebted to Maslow for articulating the obvious, it nevertheless seems obvious enough that one cannot seek personal fulfillment, dither endlessly on new ideas, and feel sympathy for others if one's physiological needs are not met, or more to the point for Americans, if one feels threatened and insecure in one's material well being. Edsall makes reference to “The Silent Revolution,” Inglehart’ s seminal 1977 book, argued that “when people grow up taking survival for granted it makes them more open to new ideas and more tolerant of out groups.” He then goes on to point out, "in effect, postwar prosperity in America and in Western Europe allowed many voters to shift their political priorities from bread-and-butter issues to less materialistic concerns, 'bringing greater emphasis on freedom of expression, environmental protection, gender equality, and tolerance of gays, handicapped people and foreigners.'" I should quickly point out that "material well being" is relative. Working class Americans don't compare themselves to the Chinese, or to any of the various African nations, they compare themselves to their parents, their own past, and other Americans, and for many working class Americans, the way of life supporting their material well being has been and continues to be seriously threatened.
I should also point out that the economic threats are not easily identified in a way that makes direct, unambiguous action possible. Globalism may certainly a threat, but the results of globalism are not unambiguous. I could argue that China, Mexico, and other low wage areas of the world have absconded with jobs traditionally American, but in truth they are not jobs that many Americans would want or want in their neighborhood. I could argue just as persuasively that Americans are exploiting labor elsewhere to insure the shelves of Walmart are stocked with cheap goods without the environmental costs. Then too immigration may certainly be a threat, but not the threat many on the far right want it to be. Setting aside terrorist concerns, which are grotesquely overblown, I could suggest that economies grow in response to demand, and that demand is fueled by two things: product innovation and increased population, as there are new and desirable products on the market to buy and more people to buy them. Product innovation in technology has been a mixed blessing, creating innovative new products that consumers want to buy, but those same technologies have fulfilled luddite fears and automated a good number of jobs out of existence. Moreover, if current trends continue and birth rates continue to fall, regardless where or how products are produced, there will be fewer people to buy them unless begin welcoming immigrants. As our own lady liberty would have it:
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!
Of course, we never really believed that, so round we go round we go round. The debates are worth having, but in the meantime, particularly for undereducated working class Americans, the way of life that has supported their material well being has been and continues to be seriously threatened.
I'm not sure which comes first, economic insecurity or the various "anti-" attitudes -- anti-immigrant, anti- global and national governance, and anti- democratic values (seen today in support of a messianic authoritarian values). Throw in anti-feminist and anti-"social justice" attitudes and the picture becomes more complete. Within a "traditional" capitialist/marxist narrative, the former would seem to stoke the latter, suggesting that "it's the economy stupid." Fix the economy, make America economically secure again in their physical well being, and we can attend to higher order concerns of self-esteem and self-actualization. There are, however, no short term fixes, at least none that seem to offer immediate advantage to those already displaced or next in line for displacement. It is easy enough to offer apparent advantage, and those seem to have a broad popular appeal, but they all ignore obvious second and third order concerns. Curtail immigration? Great, more jobs for native Americans, but how many native Americans would accept the conditions of life imposed on those migrant workers that pick our fruit? bus our tables at Chiles? Bring manufacturing back to America? Great, more jobs for Americans, but how many Americans would accept either the escalating cost of goods at Walmart or conversely the Bangladeshi wages and standard of living that would help keep prices down? Some economic trends do seem inexorable and irreversible without the sort of global collapse that would require "starting over."
The economic narrative, however, seems inadequate to the moment. Even if economic insecurity has stoked the anti-attitudes, economic insecurity alone seems an inadequate explanation. We seem to be having our fascist moment. As Englehart and Norris do put it, "insecurity encourages an authoritarian xenophobic reaction in which people close ranks behind strong leaders, with strong in-group solidarity, rejection of outsiders, and rigid conformity to group norms," but "the proximate cause of the populist vote is anxiety that pervasive cultural changes and an influx of foreigners are eroding the cultural norms one knew since childhood." If the current election has revealed anything about American political life, it has revealed that "the GOP platform is extreme in promising to promulgate strict traditionalist views of the family and child-rearing, homosexuality and gender, demanding that lawmakers use Christianity as a guide, encouraging the teaching of the bible in public schools, opposing same-sex marriage, disapproving of gay and transgender rights, baring military women in combat, declaring pornography a ‘public health criss.'" Within this mixed bag, it is one thing to reinstate bans on women in combat, quite another to reinstate strict traditionalist views of the family and child-rearing." Even if women found the idea of being "stay at home moms" appealing, it is unlikely that a single income will be sufficient for most American families. The economic forces that pushed women into the workplace cannot be wished away with an executive order, and those economic forces have contributed significantly to the discussion of simple equity issues (e.g. equal pay for equal work) and reproductive rights (e.g. paid maternity leave, along with policies that reduce the need for paid leave, early term abortion and birth control). The economic narrative would suggest, in short, that the cultural changes are not really post-materialist at fundament, but simply psychological and emotional adaptations to changes in the material conditions of life. Nevertheless, "the main common theme of populist authoritarian parties on both sides of the Atlantic" is not economic, but cultural, "a reaction against immigration and cultural change." Even if economic insecurity has stoked the anti-attitudes, economic factors alone, "such as income and unemployment rates," they note, "are surprisingly weak predictors of the populist vote" while "ideological appeals to traditional values" are much stronger predictors.
That our current chaos is caused, not by economic losses, but cultural losses, of course, does not bode well for us. If support for the populist party epitomized by Trump is "concentrated among the older generation, men, the religious, ethnic majorities, and less educated sectors of society," one can note that they are precisely those that current economic trends have dispossessed, but economic trends are abstract and abstruse. Although it is a materialist argument, how does one visualize Pickety's thesis: "when the rate of return on capital (r) is greater than the rate of economic growth (g) over the long term, the result is concentration of wealth, and this unequal distribution of wealth causes social and economic instability?" Although it has little basis in reality -- and oddly, in that way, post-factual and post-materialist -- it is much easier to imagine a Rue Paul drag queen stalking the restrooms of the local elementary school for their next victim. It is much easier to buy into the "zombie-disease" metaphor -- that homosexuality, for example, if not checked and repressed, will infect others to epidemic proportions that threaten civilization itself. It is not simply that the anti-agnda appeals "deeply to those intolerant of progressive values," it is the impossibility of actually responding to the "walking queers" metaphor. How does one respond? Condescending derision is not discussion. If those promoting the anti-agenda are "a shrinking sector swimming against the tide of generational value change in the American electorate," there is reason to hope for a more tolerant future, but the damage may well have been done. As Englehart and Norris put it, "the growing generational gap in Western societies is likely to heighten the salience of the cultural cleavage in party politics in future, irrespective of any improvements in the underlying economic conditions or any potential slowdown in globalization." As we are seeing now, there is a difference between being the insurgent party virulently against the ruling elite, and becoming the ruling elite. The insurgent anti-agenda, once enacted, becomes the agenda, with its own backlash, with its own insurgent anti-agenda, creating opportunities for demagogues on the left that are likely to be every bit as pernicious as Trump -- think Stalin or Mao.
My immediate concern, however, is the chaos itself. In response to Trump's election, I have been told "get over it, he's the president." At which point, I asked, "when did you get over the election of Obama?" As a "liberal," I believe we must address economic inequality and environmental threats, and because neither economies nor environments stop at political borders, it implies not only isolated local, but cooperative global action. I also believe we must address social inequality, which implies, of course, a set of "winners" and "losers" as we make the least among us a bit greater, and the greater among us a bit less. I believe we have a reciprocal duty to tolerance, which implies, of course, an intolerance of intolerance, particularly the sanctioned or systemic intolerance that limits opportunities for others socially and economically on purely arbitrary grounds like race, or gender, or even sexual "preference." As a "liberal," I simply cannot "get over" and accept the presidency of Trump, any more than those who are anti-liberal could accept the presidency of Obama. The disparities are simply too great, and yes, as a "liberal," I believe that the uncompromising insurgent anti-agenda of the GOP over the course of Obama administration has set an unavoidable precedent. "To compromise" now means "to be compromised," and just as the GOP would not allow themselves the disgrace of "being compromised," as a liberal, I cannot now allow myself the disgrace of "being compromised." I now represent the insurgent anti-agenda of the liberal party, which implies, of course, confrontation. Trump has already demonstrated how he deals with opposition, and even though everyone and their second cousin plays the nazi card, one cannot help but hear the historical echoes. Whether Trump is deliberately sowing the seeds of chaos or whether his monomaniacal narcissism simply leaves chaos in its wake is irrelevant. Chaos has always, it seems, demanded repression of the most virulent sort, and a resistance of the most virtuous sort. Listen again to Leonard Cohen's "The Partisan."
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