Moral Pragmatism -- part I

In my previous series of posts, I touched on any number of things, but there is one that might deserve some elaboration.  I do believe it possible (though perhaps very unlikely) that we could solve "problems" with moral pragmatism.  First, of course, before we can even begin to address solutions, we need to answer the question, "what exactly is the problem?"

Here, I would say any ad hominem answer -- that is to say, any answer that identifies a person or a group of people as the problem -- is inherently wrong.  I might be accused of the ad hominem argument when speaking of the donald, but I don't think the donald is the problem, per se, but rather symptomatic of a deeper disease that we have only begun to diagnose.  To identify a person as the core of a social problem, in the reductio ad absurdum world we inhabit, is ultimately to advocate assassination.  If the donald were truly the root cause of our social malaise, then the only cure ultimately is the removal of the cause.  I suspect that, were it possible to travel back in time, and assassinate Hitler, things might have been different, but it is highly dubious that the elimination of Hitler, per se, would have made things better, only different.  There is a beautiful Dan Bern song that plays with this recognition.  In it, he asks God to send him back to Berlin with a gun to assassinate Hitler, but God denies the request because, as God replies, 

If I sent you back 

You would get caught up 
In theory and discussion 
You would let your fears 
Delay and distract you
You would make friends 

You would take a lover 

The fears, theory and discussion, and the life that one lives at a specific time, in a specific place, would overwhelm one, even if one were not of that time, and really it is only in hindsight, given all the accidents of history, that we know to assassinate Hitler and not, say, Ernst Rohm.  At the time, it may not have been as clear.

Likewise, to identify a group as the core of a social problem is ultimately to advocate for political, ethnic, religious, or racial cleansing.   I suspect that there are deeply ingrained (and consequently deeply satisfying) traits that drive our penchant to vilify the other -- you know, the one's lurking, so to speak, out there in the bush, with spears and knives, lying in wait to kill the men, rape the women, and eat the children.  I'm being a bit melodramatic around the "threat," but the vilification of the other drives a "banding together" to meet the threat, itself deeply satisfying  It is even more satisfying because it is an appeal to the simple, the comprehensible, and the elemental conflict of the kindred good, those who are like us, those who are for us, against the evil other and all those against us.  I am disparaging of "comprehensive doctrines," particularly comprehensive religious or political doctrine, even more particularly political doctrine justified by religious doctrine, because they lead very quickly to the reductio ad absurdum of "cleansing."  The world would be peachy fine if only "they" were not in it.  We have seen it play out, time and again, through history, and it is playing out again as we "reenact" the crusades.  It is one thing to say, "I believe the evangelical right (or the secular left) is wrong about, well, nearly everything."  It is another things to say, "the evangelical right (or secular left) is inherently evil." The first could, perhaps, potentially, maybe lead to discussion.  The latter ultimately only to genocide.  

Conversely, of course, any "solution" identified as a single person is ultimately wrong.  Speaking historically and temporally, of course, neither Lenin, Hitler, the Christ or Mohammed have succeeded in "saving" us.  The world has gone on fractionally pretty much as before, except that we have the residual comprehensive doctrines of Das Kapital,  Mein Kampf, the New Testament, and the Koran, each of which purports to have the answer, once and for all, and provide boundaries for the fractures.  Whether the latter two will save us in the next life is a matter for speculation, but none have saved us in this life.  In the end, neither will the donald save us or this country, though he positions himself as the messiah and the messianic yearning among his followers for a savior is clear enough in his campaign rhetoric.   Any "solution" identified with the empowerment of a single group is, likewise, wrong.  I would hope it unnecessary to discuss Hitler's "final solution" at any length.  We want to see the vilification of the jews as a blind prejudice, but having pledged never to forget, we have forgotten  the depth and breadth of populist disdain for the jews.  We have forgotten our own American reluctance to accept jewish refugees when the nazi pogroms became clear enough.  We have forgotten how conveniently they focused and provided a justification for the exercise of repressive power.   Any group has "identity" in the first place because there are boundaries that "identify" it, and in the end the opposing group must maintain the power of its "identity" by excluding and targeting those who cannot or will not conform.  In the end, we have the nazi extermination camps, the soviet gulag, an exclusion and "cleansing" of one sort or another.   One sort or another "cultural revolution" or another will always play out.

Having said that, what exactly do I mean then by moral pragmatism?  Well, first of all, we cannot evade the "moral" question.  I have given my take on this, here and there, but ultimately I believe there is the reciprocity of the so-called golden rule -- if I don't want someone killing me, then I am obligated to refrain from killing others -- if I don't want someone raping my wife or my daughters, then I am obligated to refrain from raping the wives and daughters of others -- et cetera.  There is nothing "perfect" about the golden rule, and I don't think it provides us with anything that might resemble a "categorical imperative."  Take the first example, I don't want someone killing me.  True enough.  I don't.  Though I can think of circumstances where I might want to amend that statement (e.g. after a long, debilitating, and fruitless struggle against a terminal illness) generally speaking, for the most part, I don't want someone randomly killing me, as Johnny Cash might put it, "just to watch me die."  Take the reciprocal obligation, that I must refrain from killing others.  True enough.  I should.  Here again, I can think of circumstances where I might want to grant myself an exception (e.g if someone is threatening MY life) but generally speaking, for the most, usually, I really should refrain from killing others.  Having said that, the categorical imperative, "thou shalt not kill" can't quite hold water in all circumstances, and even the more generous "thou shalt not murder" equivocates circumstantially around a definition of "murder."  It is clearly "killing" but is it "murder" if I dispatch someone who attempts to rape my granddaughter?  So on and so forth.

Nevertheless, despite all the equivocation, I still don't want someone killing me, or robbing me, or raping me, or lying to me, or ... there is quite a list.  We cannot evade the moral question, nor can we hope to answer it, unequivocally, once and for all.  It will, so speak, always be open to question and discussion, and there is likewise no evading the questioning and the discussion.  Even with a twenty page definition of murder, outlining each and every possible exception that might conceivably permit one to take another's life, we would still need a court of law to question and discuss the definition of murder and whether a particular killing fits the definition.   Here again, the golden rule applies as a point of departure.  Were I the accused, I would WANT a full discussion, I would WANT my case to be presented, and so I am obligated to provide others, should they be the accused, with a full discussion.  I say "legislature" and "court of law" in part because I am cynical enough to know that we, as human beings, are often quite clear on what we want, but not quite willing, always, to abide by the reciprocal obligation, particularly when our interests might be served by, well, granting ourselves an exception that we would not necessarily grant to others.  Just as we cannot evade the moral question, we cannot evade the question of "law," but likewise, we cannot hope to codify our laws, unequivocally, once and for all.  We would still need a legislative body to question and refine our understanding of the "law."