By simply linking the moral and a governing intentionality, it would appear that I have done away with the distinction between the moral and the immoral. It is, in the common use, possible to have an "immoral" intentionality. It is, for example, possible to set out to create a racially and ethically pure state, to eliminate all the jews, blacks, browns, catholics, and muslims. There follows a number of instrumental acts, each of which is justified against that end, very few of which might be considered "good." I would hope that humanity has grown beyond such ends, but recent events, and discussions around town, tell me that we haven't. Donald Trump, and the populist support for Donald Trump, are a case in point. I don't know, and don't care to know, what the Donald actually believes, but he has shown a cynical disregard for historical precedence and a calculating willingness to prey on his people's almost entirely irrational fear of "radical muslims."
My point is really two-fold. First, I might say, there is still a moral decision. Just as one can choose to play or not play chess, one can choose to "provide for the basic needs of my family" or "create an ethically pure (and hence secure) state." Whether a given intentionality is moral or immoral must be decided, but regardless, one must still choose to play, or to not play, the game. Second, I might say, once one has decided to play the game, whatever it might happen to be, there follows a second set of on-going instrumental decisions around how one is to play the game.
Using chess again as a more or less trivial example, one may choose to play or not play. Once one has made that decision, once one has made the "moral decision" to seek checkmate, however, one must still decide on the various moves dedicated to that end. Here we might make distinctions based on "utility" or the effectuality of one's acts. One can play poorly or one can play well. Within the confines of the game, so to speak, one's acts will lead to "checkmate," but the on-going decisions around this move (and not that move) will determine whether one is a winner or loser. Here too we might make distinctions based on the "ethics" or permissibility of various moves. Chess has rules, around turn taking, delineating the moves one can and can't make with certain pieces, et cetera. If one makes permissible moves within the rules, so to speak, one is behaving ethically. If one makes impermissible moves outside the rules, one is "cheating" or behaving unethically.
To broaden the context, when we say, "the ends do not justify the means" we are making the distinction between "utility" and "ethics." For example, once one has made the moral decision to "provide for the basic needs of one's family," one must still decide on the means to that end. On the one hand, a person might decide to "get a job" and use the income from that job to make such provision. Or another person might decide to "sell drugs" and use the proceeds to make such provision. One act may more or less ethical or effectual than another act. On the one hand, to play it out, if the only job available to an individual is as a minimum wage convenience store clerk, his procurement of a job might well be "wholly ethical" but "completely ineffectual" to that end. On the other hand, the drug dealer might be more successful, but we can't necessarily say he is "completely ethical" in his methods. Both the convenience store clerk and the drug dealer might be acting relative to the same intentionality, to the same moral end, to provide for the basic needs of their family, but in the latter case we would still want to say "the ends do not justify the means." He is not playing within the confines of the "law" or the "rules of the game." Within my definitional scheme, he is behaving morally, but not ethically.
I feel as though I'm splitting some hairs here, but the split ends allow us to account for certain things. To take one example, we might say someone like Adolf Eichmann behaved immorally, but effectively and not unethically -- that is to say, he might say he should have decided against the moral decision to create a ethnically pure state, but having made that decision -- having decided to play Hitler's game, so to speak -- his subsequent actions were effective to that end, and given the prevailing rules within his state not unethical. When Arendt talks about the "banality of evil," she is, I believe, making these distinctions. The "evil," I want to suggest, lay in the moral decision to adopt Hitler's "final solution" as his own, the "banality" lay the utter rationality and conventionality of his subsequent instrumental and ethical behavior.
To take another example, alluded to above, we might adopt, as a good, the intentionality to "create a secure state." This is, of course, a common presidential imperative, and it's not surprising that there is debate concerning how best to achieve "security." The moral decision has more or less been made. No one debates whether "create a secure state" is good or evil. It is presumptively a "good." Having said that, however, as a move within the game, "banning Muslims" may or may not be effectual to that end, may or may not be rationalized on utilitarian grounds. Most who have supported the Donald in this statement, have rationalized it on utilitarian grounds, but to extend the example, as a move within the game of "creating a secure state," no one is calling to "ban fundamentalist or charismatic Christians," even though Timothy McVeigh was inspired, not by allegiance to Jihad, but sympathy for fundamentalist or charismatic Christianity. Why not? If we were solely concerned with effectual acts to create security, we should ban both "radical Islam" and "radical Christianity," but the ethical rule is quickly invoked in the second case. The banning of either may or may not be effectual in creating a more secure state -- on the order of utility, proof is always in the pudding, so to speak -- but in the latter case, the constitutional protections of religion, the rules limiting the behavior of presidents relative to religion, would be invoked. Why? In other words, it may be useful, but not ethical, to ban radical religion. Thankfully, even most of the Republicans spoke up regarding such "bans." We must seek other means to the end of a secure state.
So, to sum up, we make a moral decision when we adopt (or reject) a governing intentionality. Once adopted, we make subsequent instrumental and ethical decisions about how "best" to effectuate that intentionality. These are definitional tools for analysis, and I'm hoping that they prove to be helpful. As a sidebar note, definitions are nevertheless important. The "why not" and "why" above point at their importance. The constitutional protections would be invoked relative to Islam because, well, by definition, it's a religion, the one true religion, the one the framers of the constitution meant when they said "religion," and the other is, as we all know, something else entirely, at the very best a false religion, its followers among Satan's legions ... whoops, got that backward, but the point stands ... Get it?
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