The way in which most comprehensive doctrines, of the sort espoused by most religions, are maintained is through willful ignorance. This is particularly true of text based religions, and perhaps why Plato distrusted "writing." I won't fall off the post-structuralist cliff and engage too much in the philosophy of language. I will simply say (influenced mostly by Searle) that language is for the most part instrumental -- in other words, the one making a statement intends to "do something" with it, and that "something done" engages others.
For example, take the following statement: "in the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." In it, we might say, the "speaker," the scribe of God, intends to represent the world in which we live to his "audience," humanity. Except insofar as it is ostensibly holy writ, the word of God, it is no different, in kind, from the statement, "in the beginning, a big bang brought the universe into being." In it, the speaker intends to represent the world in which we live to his "audience." Because they are representational in intent, the statements are both subject to a "truth" test -- in other words, the statements either do or do not accurately represent the world -- or perhaps more precisely, as the audience of the statements, we form a judgement as to the accuracy of the statements relative to the world we presumably inhabit in common. For the vast majority of us, not much is at stake in either case. The former we recognize as religious, the latter scientific, but because both represent a truth so remote, it makes little difference which we believe. We go on about our lives as before.
Let's take another more down to earth example where something is at stake: "He's the one who shot and killed Mary Jane." If the statement is made from the jury box, and if you are the one referenced by the pronoun "he," then it makes a significant difference whether the statement is true or false. We bring evidence that will either prove or disprove the claim being made. "It couldn't be me. At the time of the shooting, I was away on a business trip to a neighboring state. Here's the plane ticket that took me there. Here's the hotel and restaurant receipts for lodging and meals. Here is Joe Smith who will testify to my actual presence there." The exonerating evidence is largely "circumstantial," and really doesn't bear directly on the claim, but it's the sort of tangible evidence we would credit, and we know enough of the world to know in particular that bullets do not travel from one state to another to take their victims. The statement, "he's the one who shot and killed Mary Jane" is very, very likely false, and the one making the claim is mistaken. To your great relief, the bailiff releases you to go on about your life as before.
Would it make a difference if the one making claim did so as follows: "God revealed to me in a private vision that he's the one who shot and killed Mary Jane." I doubt that the district attorney would prosecute on that basis, and few, even the most religious, would simply accept the claim prima facia. They would particularly object if they were the object of accusation, and would like almost everyone else question the sanity and veracity of the accuser, and if really pressed would bring forth the same sorts of tangible evidence to discredit his statement. You will note that I say "discredit his statement," not "disprove it." It is still not possible to prove a negative, that the accused did not do it. It's a very remote possibility that you "faked" the evidence of plane tickets, boarding passes, credit card receipts, and the like. For even the computer expert, however, in this day and age, the enormity of that task would be daunting. One would need to hack, not one, but several very secure computer systems and insert falsified information. In other words, it's not just a matter of faking the receipt. The veracity of the tickets and receipts can be verified, independently, within the computer systems of United Airlines and Visa. Given the evidence, the statement still lacks credibility despite the accuser's preliminary claim of God's revelation.
So, a couple of additional questions: what would it take to make you believe the statement "God revealed to me in a private vision ...?" You know, of course, where this is going. When it is making a factual claim about the universe we inhabit, most would want some tangible verification. What is the difference between the former and this: "God revealed to the scribe of Genesis in a private vision ... " In the cultural baggage that each carries there is, of course, considerable difference, but so far as statements go, not much. As one person put it to me a few days ago, "if you believe in the Bible at all ..." Well, when it is making a factual claim about the universe we inhabit, I would want the tangible evidence in support of that claim. If the tangible evidence contradicts the claim then to actually believe the factual claim as "truth," despite the evidence, would require an act of willful ignorance. I would need, in other words, to intentionally ignore much of what I know about the world around me. For example, again, if I believe in the factual truth of the statement "God created man in his own image ..." What would I need to keep under the veil of ignorance if I were to actually believe it as a prima facia statement of fact? In the absence of evolutionary explanations, what would I do with racial differences? Is the image of God actually negroid, caucasion, or asian? You can see, suddenly, it is not a trivial question.
There is another sense to the question, "what would it take to make you believe?" I will operate on the assumption that it is impossible to coerce actual belief. I will draw a distinction between persuasion and coercion. I can be persuaded to believe otherwise, given evidence that convinces me, but ultimately I believe what I believe in spite of myself. It is not, however, impossible to coerce conformity to the appearance of belief, conformity to an act of willful ignorance, and coercion ultimately necessitates violence or at least the credible threat of violence. If it is of the utmost importance that you believe in the truth of a comprehensive doctrine -- whether it be absolute and unequivocal truth of the Bible, or the Koran, or Das Capital -- am I justified in using violence to coerce at least conformity to an appearance of belief? You can see again it is not a trivial question.
A side note:
To say the Bible represents something of a "symbolic truth" distances the act of willful ignorance one remove. To make this addition claim of the text, if you will, I would need to engage in a so-called willing suspension of disbelief that we associate with the interpretation of fiction, and I would need to make claims about the text itself which are subject to "verification" of a different sort. I would be asserting that the scribe's intent was to was to symbolize this truth and that truth is "..." In other words, I would need to expend effort providing evidence that the author's intent was to create a symbol of a truth and that truth is "..." In the words of my students, I would need to "read into" the text something it does not say explicitly. I would be providing an "interpretation" of the text beyond its simple propositional value and that interpretation would itself would be open to challenge. I would still need to provide "extra-textual" evidence that the truth symbolized is, well, true.
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